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Ramachandran 1 
Information technologies, such as the internet and smartphones, have become ubiquitous. 
Using these technologies, individuals generate vast amounts of data about themselves, from what 
they like to the places they frequent. Information that was once not publicly accessible is now 
available to companies that manage the technologies and, in turn, to governments that hope to 
know more about their citizens. Ideally, the personal data gathered can be used to address 
pressing issues and better provision resources. 
Technology, however, is changing faster than the legal mechanisms and the social norms 
that should govern it, reducing trust in how technologies collect and process personal data. With 
a global race to develop better artificial intelligence, the emphasis on data is growing with 
potentially dystopian consequences. “Big data” can undermine freedom by increasing the 
potential for surveillance, discrimination, manipulation, and other harms. 
The way data rights fit into existing institutions can preserve freedom, reaping the 
benefits of information technologies. In this paper, I will examine how data enables control and 
how to navigate this trend responsibly. I propose a capability approach to data rights in which 
data use should enable trust in computing and allow individuals to pursue their conception of the 
good life without fear of abuse. By improving individuals’ lives and by removing obstacles in 
their way, data use should increase the number of things individuals are able to do and be. Data 
rights should ensure that data use, especially by governments and companies, respects 
individuals’ freedom of choice and does not decrease the number of capabilities individuals 
have.  
First, I will specify the scope of technology I am addressing, narrowing the discussion to 
personal data used by information technologies. Then, I will situate the question of data rights in 
a broader historical context regarding the use of information in society, drawing on information 
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collection and processing practices from the 19th and 20th centuries. I will demonstrate how 
information facilitates control, which necessitates legislation to protect freedom. From there, I 
will argue that the market’s emphasis on property and privacy rights will insufficiently address 
personal data protection. Renewed legislation should combine privacy and property rights with 
other considerations. As such, I will propose a capability approach to grounding data rights in 
which data would empower individuals to live as they choose, respecting their freedom. This 
view will (1) refocus discourse on how we can engender trust in data use so as to expand 
opportunity and (2) provide a mechanism for rights to contend with violations of freedom even 
as technology changes. To illustrate the framework’s usefulness, I will analyze the European 
Union’s recent General Data Protection Regulation and demonstrate how it does not adequately 
correct personal data abuses and likely will not adapt to technological change. 
 
SCOPE OF INTEREST: DEFINING DATA, FREEDOM, AND PROTECTION 
Data rights should focus on the collection and processing of personal data, which can be 
attributed to specific individuals and can be used to identify them (van den Hoven and Weckert 
307). This can include credit card transactions, genetic information, online communications, 
internet protocol (IP) addresses, and so on.1  
Traditionally, data is distinct from information in that data is unprocessed but could be 
processed to generate meaning (van den Hoven and Weckert 301). Information is already 
processed to contain meaning. In other words, data is the raw input that is processed to produce 
information. However, I will be using the two terms data and information differently, 
distinguishing them based on whether a digital computer can directly read, process, and store 
                                                 
1 Anonymized data is still personal data as it can be de-anonymized and be attributed to a specific individual.  
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each. I will use data to refer to the digital and use information to refer to the analog. Inputs 
directly accessible to digital computers are data, and inputs not directly accessible to digital 
computers are information. This semantic distinction will keep conversations about the historical 
uses of information distinct from current uses of data. The framework for data rights I will be 
proposing can apply to both data and information as traditionally understood (i.e., raw versus 
processed input), but it will be more relevant to digital data as I am conceiving of it. As I will 
explain later, this is because violations of freedom are more acute with modern computing, 
which uses digital data. 
Freedom in this paper is conceived of both negatively and positively. Negative freedom 
involves processes that guarantee noninterference whereas positive freedom provides 
opportunities for specific functionings. I will further explain how this distinction matters when I 
describe a capability approach to data rights.  
To address freedom, data rights should emphasize protection,2 which I am conceiving of 
broadly to include security and privacy as well as equality and autonomy.3 Data rights should 
protect individuals’ interests during data collection and processing, engendering trust. Under 
reasonable circumstances, individuals should know that their personal data will not be used 
against them but for them. This way, individuals can have (and hopefully will take) the 
opportunity to benefit from advances in computing without fearing abuse. Ultimately, data rights 
should guide how (not) to use personal data to address the fundamental political question of how 
those with power should treat individuals. 
 
                                                 
2 Although in the computer science community, data protection refers to security (e.g., encryption) whereas data 
privacy refers to access. 
3 I will later argue that what protection entails should be determined through public reasoning. Security, privacy, 
equality, and autonomy are what I see as best describing our moral intuitions about personal data use.   
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A HISTORICAL CONTEXT: A PRECEDENT FOR LEGISLATION 
Historically, information has lent itself to control, and legislation has been necessary to uphold 
our freedom. Now, data lends itself to more ubiquitous and refined control, and our legal systems 
have not adapted to this change. Renewed legislation is necessary to protect freedom.  
The foundation for our contemporary information collection and processing practices 
originated in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Robertson and Travaglia). James Beniger in The 
Control Revolution argues that the Industrial Revolution vastly increased the speed and volume 
of economic activity, challenging our capacity to control it. The change first happened in the 
railroads during the 1840s and slowly spread to other sectors of the economy. Without quickly 
transmittable information about train routes, fatal and expensive accidents occurred on the 
increasingly fast and popular railroads. Similarly, other sectors of the economy struggled to 
contend with speed and volume. With automated processing, mills overproduced grains and 
needed to stimulate consumption, and wholesalers needed to find ways to sell goods from a 
growing number of manufacturers. Controlling transportation, production, distribution, and 
consumption became crucial to safely and efficiently generating value in the economy (426-436).  
Innovations in information processing and collection addressed this growing need. 
Advances in telecommunications produced the telephone and the radio during this period, which 
helped transmit and capture important information. Improving processing and collection even 
manifested as creating uniform standard time and creating electric typewriters (Beniger 430-
432). Changes in information technologies allowed for centralized control over a vast number of 
processes that would have once required distributed interpersonal relationships.  
Practices were not only applied industrially but also socially by individuals, companies, 
and governments (Beniger 429). The growth in information technologies resulted in access to 
Ramachandran 5 
consumers goods, such as electronic calculators, that individuals could use to reach their own 
ends. Internally, companies collected information about production to more efficiently organize 
employees. Externally, companies analyzed consumption patterns, from clothing sizes to biscuit 
preferences, by collecting and processing vast amounts of information. Understanding these 
patterns, companies could better provision their resources to serve individuals’ needs and desires. 
Governments also began more systematically processing information about individuals. Herman 
Hollerith, whose company would merge with others to form IBM, developed a punch card 
system for the United States Census Bureau (Beniger 411). With his system, the 1890 Census 
collected information about the American population much more quickly and accurately than 
before, providing more accessible insight about the population (Beniger 414).  
Such technology, however, also enabled undue control over individuals, violating their 
freedom. Information technologies were used to categorize individuals into social groups and 
target ones seen as undesirable or dangerous. In the 1930s, the Nazis obtained Hollerith’s punch 
card technology from IBM’s German subsidiary to survey the population and maintain extensive 
databases (IBM). The information was used to identify and murder Jews with ruthless efficiency. 
After the United States joined the war, the Census Bureau disclosed information on Japanese 
Americans to the Department of War, facilitating their internment (Minkel). Two decades later, 
during President Richard Nixon’s administration, the United States federal government targeted 
perceived political dissidents, including members of the Democratic Party and Vietnam War 
protestors (Levinson-Waldman 6).  
Legislation was enacted to limit how government could control individuals through their 
personal information, giving precedent for renewed legislation. In 1954, the United States 
Congress created a permanent federal statute to ensure that the Census Bureau could not publish 
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identifiable personal information or share it with other government agencies (United States, Title 
13 Section 9). In 1974, Congress also instituted the Privacy Act to prevent federal surveillance 
using citizens’ identifiable personal information except in specified circumstances (Levinson-
Waldman 7) . Both measures have been debased over time. Technologically, advances in 
computing make de-anonymization of published census data more feasible (Jarmin). Politically, 
the September 11th attacks in the United States led to legislation (e.g., Patriot Act) that has 
granted federal agencies more powers to surveil the population with information technologies 
(Levinson-Waldman 8). Since previous legislation limiting control has been eroded by future 
legislation or changes in technology, the laws also represent how legislation on technology 
should be broad and dynamic to account for changes. 
Although the ways we use personal data are rooted in practices from earlier, there are key 
differences that make data more amenable to control and more resistant to protection than 
information. Namely, the volume of collection and the sophistication of processing has 
dramatically increased. This increase has facilitated more ubiquitous and refined control by both 
companies and governments but less oversight by those affected. From the invention of writing 
to the year 2006, humans had gathered approximately 180 exabytes of data, but by 2011, 
however, that number had reached 1,600 exabytes, increasing fourfold every three years (Floridi 
435). Data collection has become ubiquitous; everyday tasks generate data that can be processed 
to generate insights. These insights are “small patterns” about individuals allows everything from 
personalized recommendations on entertainment platforms to medicine tailored to one’s genome 
(Floridi 436). The control is calibrated to the individual, not limiting itself to social groups like 
before. To reach these insights, artificial intelligence and other sophisticated information 
processing techniques have been developed.  
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The increased sophistication of processing has led to information asymmetry between 
technology producers and consumers. Those with the technical acumen and the resources 
necessary to collect and process data can do so with little oversight – both about accuracy and 
fairness. It is much easier to understand how the United States Department of War targeted 
Japanese Americans than to understand how a recidivism algorithm used in sentencing flagged 
someone as likely to commit a crime again. Without the proper understanding, individuals 
cannot oversee data collection and processing and advocate for their interests. 
Furthermore, the conversion from analog to digital underpins another disconnect. The 
difficulty of storing and retrieving paper files in the past constituted an “institutional 
forgetfulness” (Blanchette and Johnson 35). However, as database technology has improved, the 
same forgetfulness does not shield individuals anymore; information is retained and accessed 
indefinitely. Being surveilled in such a way, molds our behavior and prevents new beginnings. 
“Bankruptcy law, juvenile criminal records, and credit reporting” are the only remaining vestiges 
of institutional forgetfulness in many countries (Blanchette and Johnson 39).   
China epitomizes how modern data processing and collection facilitate control over 
individuals. The country’s 13th Five-Year Plan guides how the Chinese economy should 
function from 2016 to 2020. The “Made in China 2025” plan in particular advances a form of 
“technonationalism,” encouraging domestic technology production taken from development 
elsewhere in the world (Koleski and Salidjanova 1). The emphasis on domestic production will 
give Chinese companies and the government better access to data on citizens because they will 
not have to rely on foreign companies to collect data for them, increasing China’s domestic 
capacity for control. This can be seen in the growth of Chinese technology companies, such as 
Baidu and Alibaba, and their close relationship with the Chinese Communist Party. More 
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specifically, three Chinese efforts illustrate how the country is leveraging data for control. First, 
Alibaba-backed City Brain, deployed in multiple cities, is using sensor networks and artificial 
intelligence to understand and control citizen behavior, mainly focusing on traffic management 
(Beall). Second, Chinese authorities in strategically located and oil-rich Xinjiang province hope 
to suppress the Muslim Uighur population, ostensibly to curb terrorism and create stability. 
Enabling facial recognition in video surveillance and monitoring popular messaging platform 
WeChat has allowed Chinese authorities to identify dissidents and send them to re-education 
camps (The Economist). Third, China’s proposed Social Credit System would assign citizens and 
companies a reputation score, which increases with socially beneficial behavior and decreases 
with infractions (Helbing et al.). Low scores will result in punishments, including bans from 
flights. Whether or not the system materializes, it would have been unthinkable without the 
ubiquitous and refined control that modern data processing and collection facilitate.  
At least in liberal democracies where property rights are respected, there is a case for 
individual ownership over personal data. Although this can be helpful in addressing control, 
property rights can only partially substantiate data rights. The market, however, is tending 
towards private property as the foundation for data rights, necessitating intervention through 
legislation. 
 
PROPERTY AND PRIVACY: INSUFFICIENT FOR DATA RIGHTS 
Before I propose a capability approach to data rights legislation, I will first explain why relying 
on the market will insufficiently protect freedom. The dominant discourse around data rights 
highlights property and privacy rights. Apple and Facebook, for instance, have emphasized 
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property and privacy as the foundations for data protection on their products (Tisne). The 
argument is as follow: 
 
1. Using another person’s property requires their consent.  
2. Without consent, their property should remain private (i.e., be left alone). 
3. Data is property.  
4. Using another person’s data requires their consent. 
5. Without consent, their data should remain private (i.e., be left alone).  
 
Here, the emphasis on data as private property does not account for issues with ownership, 
consent, and privacy that personal data has.  
 
Property. A property rights framework does not help create general principles about how (not) 
to use data so as to protect freedom and engender trust (Tisne). Informed consent cannot be 
established because of haphazard ownership over and information asymmetry about personal 
data. Even if consent is established, withdrawing it does not entail protection (Tisne).   
Understanding who owns and can use data is unclear because of (1) an individual’s 
limited agency in producing data, (2) effortless and endless replicability of data, and (3) 
jurisdictional fragmentation over the internet (i.e., the network has a global reach but the legal 
mechanisms governing it do not). Everyday tasks from sending emails to using credit cards 
generate personal data, but individuals do not have control over the data. The lack of control is 
not simply because legislation is lacking but because it would be infeasible to know the full 
extent of what data you have produced – much less own and control it. There is simply too much 
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data. This is further complicated by the fact that data can be endlessly replicated and transferred 
to others. Finally, when the individuals who have access to personal data reside in different 
jurisdictions than where their data is stored, understanding which jurisdiction’s property rights 
laws apply becomes unclear as well. 
Putting the concepts together, Ann can take a picture of her friend John and send it to her 
friend Hillary – all in the United States. Hillary can then upload the picture to her profile on 
www.yourpictures.com, which has most of its data centers in Ireland. Your Picture’s policies 
also stipulate that the website has a broad license to use any pictures uploaded and derive 
insights from them. All three actors could reasonably claim ownership to the picture, and they 
may each have different views on how they want Your Pictures to use the personal data. Because 
Ann physically took the picture, she has a clear claim to ownership. The picture is now uploaded 
to Hillary’s profile, so according to Your Picture’s policies, Hillary owns the data. All the while, 
the picture is of John, and he wants control over how his likeness proliferates over the global 
internet. To make matters more confusing, the United States and Ireland have different laws on 
who can own the personal data and how they can use it. It is unclear what Your Pictures should 
do with the uploaded data.  
With increasingly more devices connecting to the internet and sharing data, the problems 
with determining ownership and use like the one above will become more complex. In an 
automated vehicle, for example, vast quantities of high-resolution data will be collected about 
the environment outside (including individuals and their property) and the passengers inside. 
This data will be processed not only onboard the vehicle but also by others, from nearby vehicles 
to artificial intelligence companies in other countries. Ownership will become increasingly 
unclear. 
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Informed consent not only requires clear ownership, but it also requires an understanding 
of what is being consent to. The information asymmetry between technology producers and 
consumers makes informed consent a difficult proposition. Even when ownership and consent is 
established, preventing access to personal data does not entail protection from malicious data use 
practices. Collected data is used to produce models that can categorize individuals and predict 
behavior based on their attributes. This has a “spill-over effect” wherein insights generated by 
the model can be applied to individuals not used to construct the model (Purtova 221). For 
example, even if a privacy conscious individual prevents a service from extensively collecting 
data about themselves, others who have granted access can help produce a model such that the 
service can still accurately categorize the individual and predict their behaviors. 
 
Privacy. The traditional conception of privacy is also limiting and infeasible. When conceived 
of as the negative right to be left alone, privacy implies that individuals have something to hide 
or that they are choosing not to cooperate with others. Instead, privacy should focus on the social 
benefits of not interfering in individuals’ lives and allowing them to develop; it is a collective 
good. Even when conceived of positively, privacy based on consent encourages individuals to be 
sparing with what personal data they share, limiting their opportunities. This is because requiring 
consent puts the heavy burden of ensuring responsible personal data processing and collection on 
the individual. Reasonable privacy should be the rule, not something additional to request. 
The negative rights conception of privacy haphazardly conjures up a binary – between 
individuals and society. Privacy as the right to be let alone implies suspicious activity. It 
questions why individuals want privacy and what they have to hide. The negative rights 
conception suggests that privacy is mainly for concealing information from society. It pits 
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individual rights against societal objectives, including “efficiency, crime control, and an honest 
work force” (Regan 19). Those who prize privacy could be seen as uncooperative. This conflict 
has systematically eroded privacy. Especially following the September 11th attacks, governments 
have undertaken far-reaching surveillance, drastically stripping citizens of privacy. To those 
governments, national security trumps individual interests. Losing privacy is a small cost to pay 
for the prospect of enduring security. Lastly, privacy as an individual’s impenetrable space is not 
possible anymore (Bennett 485). Everyday tasks require using information technology; 
individuals’ data inevitably interact with others. Whether participants are willing or not, data 
packets travel to other countries they do not know and to companies they have not authorized. 
Privacy as a distinct boundary between individuals and society is almost impossible to achieve. 
Instead, privacy should consider the social benefits that arise when individuals can develop 
without interference. 
Moreover, the focus should be on the many uses of personal data that can benefit the 
individual when done with privacy in mind. Privacy based on consent requires that individuals 
spend considerable effort understanding how personal data is processed and collected to make 
decisions on when to grant access. This is burdensome, causing individuals to over or under 
correct. Under-correcting for privacy is the norm, but overcorrection is also possible. For 
example, access to anonymized traffic data is a collective good (Tisne). When a large number of 
individuals contribute, everyone can see where there are congested roads and traffic incidents, 
tailoring their routes. If most individuals keep this data private for fear that the data can be easily 
de-anonymized, then the collective benefit disappears. By making reasonable privacy standards 
the rule, data rights legislation should focus engendering trust in personal data use without 
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requiring the individual to assume the responsibility. However, there are also other values of 
equality, autonomy, and security that privacy alone cannot address. 
 
FREEDOM PROTECTED AND TRUST ENGENDERED 
If the property and privacy rights alone will not protect freedom and engender trust, how else do 
we ground data rights? I will argue that a capability approach that expands on the property and 
privacy rights framework will best engender trust in personal data use, especially given the 
legacy of control through information. Since laws on technology should be dynamic to account 
for rapid change, we should legislate negatively and prohibit personal data use that violates 
freedom (as opposed to specifying what is permissible). Through public reasoning, a capability 
approach will help calibrate those freedoms. This view of personal data facilitates trust, 
encouraging individuals to use advances in computing to improve their lives. 
  
Freedom and Trust. Public trust is lacking in data processing and collection because we have 
not developed robust social and legal norms to govern proper use. This is due to how fast 
technology has changed and because of wanton abuses of control. As a result, when companies 
and governments use personal data, the public does not oversee how they collect and process it. 
Those affected by improper use have little legal recourse as well. Security breaches happen 
routinely, divulging personal data about individuals to malicious actors. Social media websites 
and other companies can track an individual across multiple websites and create detailed profiles 
of them – all without the individual’s knowledge. Crime detection algorithms using personal data 
can over-police marginalized communities. This is because there are few enforceable rules 
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regarding how data can be used. While there are standards set by industry and practices 
recommended by advocacy groups, they are rarely followed.  
 In contrast, when using money or roads, there are laws in place to encourage trust. There 
are guidelines about how banks can operate, and there are codes to prevent structurally unsafe 
bridges. Individuals have an expectation that when they deposit money in a bank or drive over a 
bridge that they are protected from abuse. Such protection facilitates trust in systems and 
encourages socially beneficial use. When individuals deposit money into banks, banks can lend 
more, and when individuals drive on bridges, they can transport more goods. 
Legislation supporting freedom over personal data can facilitate trust in processing and 
collection of it. Capabilities will address one component: opportunity freedoms. A focus on 
opportunities will highlight how personal data should ideally be used to improve individuals’ 
lives. Although the law should not dictate how personal data should be processed and collected 
(as this is too restrictive), the foundation for how we conceive of data should be rooted in how it 
can improve lives – not whether or not someone owns it and has specific rights to it. When we 
engage in public reasoning or when the courts rule on personal data use cases, opportunity to 
improve lives should be a focal consideration. The legacy of personal information used to control 
populations and violate freedoms necessitates this high standard. Rights, as I am conceiving of 
them, will address another component of this trust: process freedoms. These freedoms will 
outline what personal data use should not be allowed. Prohibitions on unsafe or unfair data use 




Rights and Capabilities. The courts and public reasoning should determine which process 
freedoms legislation should uphold and which opportunity freedoms we should collectively 
strive towards. However, I will outline what I see as our intuitions about both concerning 
personal data. I will outline four rights and demonstrate how capabilities could be used to 
calibrate prohibitions on certain practices.  
First, the capability approach can address process freedom violations and dynamically 
account for changes in technology. Use of data should allow an individual to increase the set of 
functions they can perform without giving up existing functions. Allowing others to use an 
individual’s data should pass this standard. More specifically, the capability approach is a 
framework used to evaluate “individual well-being and social arrangements” (Robeyns 93). The 
framework examines capabilities to function. It posits that individuals should have substantive 
opportunities to “lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what they want to do and be the 
person they want to be” (Robeyns 95). Capabilities and functionings are distinct concepts. 
Capabilities represent possibilities to do or be something whereas functionings are the 
possibilities manifested. The goal is to increase individuals’ capabilities so that they may choose 
which functionings to pursue. One such capability is for bodily health. Every individual should 
have the substantive opportunity to live with good bodily health, whether they choose to pursue 
it or not. Having good bodily health is an example of a functioning (i.e., a realized capability). 
The hope is that increasing the number of capabilities individuals have will increase well-being, 
justice, and development.  
   Rights and process freedoms, on the other hand, address how actions are taken, regardless 
of outcome although process and outcome are often related (Sen 641). Due process in trial is an 
example. A criminal may be imprisoned for a crime she committed, but if she did not receive a 
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fair trial, her freedom has been violated. As mentioned before, discourse around rights over 
personal data focus on process. Process freedoms are upheld not only because they respect 
human dignity but also because they produce favorable outcomes when they are generally 
upheld. When principles are upheld over time, they create stability. Individuals can internalize 
the norms and know what to expect from social systems, allowing them to plan their lives in 
accordance with the facts of the world.4 This produces good social outcomes. With due process, 
for instance, individuals can have a reasonable level of trust in the court system, encouraging 
cooperation.  
There are four process freedoms for data use I will outline (Tisne; van den Hoven and 
Weckert 311-319). This is not an exhaustive list, but it points to the prevailing norms we have 
about data use. Freedom from loss protects property (when ownership over data can be 
understood) from theft and other such abuses. Companies should be required to have strong 
security features to protect personal data they store, and a negligent lack of security should be 
penalized. Freedom from surveillance protects individuals from being constantly monitored, 
ensuring a positive conception of privacy. Monitoring that prevents individuals from developing 
as they fit should not be permitted. Freedom from discrimination should ensure that personal 
data is not used to target or otherwise limit groups, especially protected classes like marginalized 
minorities. Finally, freedom from manipulation should be stipulated to protect individuals’ 
autonomy. Protecting autonomy is the most foundational freedom of the four I have outlined, 
giving individuals the capability to pursue their conception of the good life. Unduly infringing on 
autonomy should carry the harshest penalties. 
                                                 
4 For more information on this classical liberal view, see (Hayek). 
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Like the right to speech, these rights to process freedoms are sweeping and will require 
legislation and litigation to specify when they apply. Although they do not determine when to 
intervene, the freedoms are important for regulating the behavior of individuals using data. The 
way in which this legislation first forms is complex. The initial legislation should take the form 
of a list of practices that are not allowed so as to protect human dignity. There should be another 
standard for understanding when to act on a perceived process freedom violation or when there is 
a new process freedom we have not thought of applying to technology. The goal is to develop 
general principles that when upheld create good social outcomes. 
A capability approach to these data rights will help illustrate what sorts of practices 
should be prohibited by process freedoms. Let us take the freedom from manipulation for 
example. Using social media websites inherently involves manipulation, but if there is a process 
freedom from manipulation, when does manipulation become impermissible? Specifically, most 
social media websites are supported by advertisement revenues. The way the websites receive 
advertisement revenue is by collecting personal data about users and selling opportunities to 
advertise to particular individuals, depending on their preferences. Armed with such personal 
data, the advertisers and websites both extract data and attention from users. This could be 
considered manipulation, yet it seems permissible. Using social media increases individuals’ 
capabilities to connect with others and know what is happening around them. Collecting personal 
data to sell curated advertisements facilitates individuals’ connections with others and seems to 
align with norms we have about marketing. On the other hand, in 2012, Facebook data scientists 
conducted experiments to understand how users responded to expressions of emotions (Kramer 
et al. 8788-8790). Decreasing the amount of positive emotional posts shown to users increased 
the number of negative emotional posts users themselves posted and vice versa. The experiment 
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was conducted on approximately 700,000 users without their knowledge (Kramer et al. 8788-
8790). Here, there seems to be another clear example of manipulation, but this time, it does not 
seem permissible. I would argue that it is because it reduces someone’s capability to form their 
own thoughts and have their own emotions, choosing how to live. This seems to be the 
foundation for our norm about informed consent. 
Whether or not there is a violation of process freedom as traditionally understood, there 
should be reason to investigate why and prevent future behavior if individuals’ capabilities are 
diminished. Perhaps the freedom from discrimination should include a freedom from biased 
datasets when concerning critical uses of personal data. Biased datasets can fall under our 
intuitive understanding of discrimination if they are used to unfairly target individuals from 
marginalized social groups. However, biased datasets may also result in discrimination if they 
are not adequately taking into account marginalized social groups for understanding genetic 
predispositions to disease. A personalized healthcare application that cannot warn members of a 
certain group about genetic predispositions might be limiting their capability to live a long life. 
Although this would not necessarily count as discrimination, under a capability approach it 
would, adding more nuance to the process freedoms outlined previously.  
Overall, adding a capability approach to understanding data rights broadens the discourse 
on data rights to include not only protecting individuals but also engendering trust so that 
individuals may benefit from advances in computing. The way this framework could manifest 
into law is unpredictable. One possibility could be to establish an agency that periodically audits 
technology companies, especially large ones like Google, for violations of the process freedoms I 
have outlined. Affected individuals and advocacy groups could also report violations to the 
agency. If violations are found, harsh penalties should be levied on the company. Many 
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companies will take violations to court, allowing the legal system to weigh on our political 
intuitions and help the freedoms adapt to changing technology. All the while, the capabilities 
approach should ground public reasoning and legal argumentation in the idea that personal data 
use is more than about concerns with property.   
APPROACH APPLIED: GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
In 2016, the European Union (EU) passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to 
replace the Data Protection Directive from 1995 starting in 2018. The goal of the legislation is to 
strengthen “data protection as a fundamental right” and “harmonize data privacy laws” across 
EU member states (European Union, Article 1). The regulation posits a series of principles and 
rights that data controllers (i.e., those who process data for non-personal use) must uphold. 
GDPR outlines several other provisions, of which I will highlight some. The law creates 
independent supervisory authorities to monitor data controllers and requires that sufficiently 
large data controllers maintain internal data protection officers. It also mandates protections for 
sensitive processing situations, including those for national identification numbers and access to 
official documents. Supervisory authorities will meet violations with harsh fines and will 
facilitate judicial remedy for affected individuals. Individuals may also file complaints against 
supervisory authorities themselves. Through these provisions, the regulation seeks to protect 
individuals and engender trust over personal data use.  
Applying the capability approach to data rights, I will explain why GDPR is a good initial 
step but is still insufficient for proper protection. Although the regulation accounts for many of 
the important considerations I have outlined above, the EU has written the law incompatibly with 
the “data environment” we live in, making many of the provisions technologically infeasible 
(Zarsky 996). The GDPR simultaneously includes overly sweeping provisions and overly 
Ramachandran 20 
specific provisions. As a result, the legislation will not adapt to technological change and may 
stymie the change itself (Downes). The GDPR also lacks regulations on law enforcement and 
national security agencies, and it does not sufficiently address the risk of manipulation.  
 The legislation addresses privacy, security, and discrimination as core issues plaguing 
personal data processing and collection. It provides helpful ways to prevent and remedy constant 
surveillance, data breaches, and unfair practices. The establishment of supervisory authorities, in 
particular, assists in identifying violations by data controllers and creating trust in data use. 
 On the other hand, the GDPR grounds itself in the property rights framework for data 
protection without sufficiently addressing the complexities of ownership and consent.5 Sweeping 
provisions that rely on property rights will create more problems than they will solve. To address 
the issue of unclear ownership of data, the GDPR defines a “data subject” as an individual about 
whom there is identifiable data (European Union, Article 4). A data subject has rights over how 
their personal data is processed unless it is required by law. Data ownership, here, is defined 
broadly to avoid the complexities in determining it, including limited agency in producing data 
and the endless replicability of it. Avoiding the complexities does not make them disappear. If a 
data subject has rights over almost all personal data about themselves, then there will be issues 
with feasibly granting such rights. There is simply too much personal data in existence to fully 
grant the rights stipulated by GDPR. The right of access, for instance, allows a data subject to 
ask a data controller if they are processing her personal data. If so, the data controller is required 
to give her access to all relevant data and provide information about the processing. However, an 
individual who requests access to his personal data on a social media website will only receive 
                                                 
5 The regulation does not explicitly apply property to personal data, but it implies property rights as I have 
conceived of them earlier. Individuals have privileged domains over their personal data. For others to access this 
protected personal data, the relevant individuals must consent. Otherwise, the personal data must be left alone and, 
at times, erased. 
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part of his personal data stored by the website. Identifiable data contained in other users’ 
profiles, such as pictures including the individual, will not be included unless the data has been 
explicitly linked to him. Requiring data controllers to try to fully comply is a burdensome 
mandate. Moreover, GDPR relies strongly on consent to allow personal data processing; the 
consent must be “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous” (European Union, Article 
4). This model of consent can work when the processing is simple and narrow. A social media 
website, on the other hand, can process vast amounts of information about users, from how long 
the user spends on the platform to understanding their political preferences. Informing the user of 
all the relevant personal data processing the website engages in would be infeasible. Yet, GDPR 
does not give guidance on which uses of personal data should be explained, empowering data 
controllers room to hide unsavory practices. Rooted in property, the regulation creates a bevy of 
positively understood rights with sweeping powers – without providing proper guidance and 
without addressing important issues in ownership and consent. 
 GDPR has overly specific provisions to complement its overly sweeping ones. 
Regulations about email tracking and marketing are one such example. The legislation provides a 
rigid procedure for what is allowed when sending marketing emails to subscribers. Namely, 
GDPR outlines how consumers must opt-in to the emails. Without consent from individuals, 
services also cannot track information about engagement with emails, marketing or otherwise. 
The worry is that personal data about email engagement could reveal minute details about 
someone, including where they read the email and who they sent it to. Rudimentary delivery and 
read receipts are allowed though. Marketing emails are cumbersome, and tracking engagement is 
intrusive. However, these harms do not seem drastic enough to include in legislation about 
personal data protection.  
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 Together, both the sweeping and the specific provisions limit how dynamically the 
legislation can adapt to new technologies and may even their development. The specificity in the 
GDPR prevents the law from easily changing over time. The provisions on email tracking and 
marketing as well as those detailing how to ask for consent on web pages could become defunct. 
The sweeping provisions will also prevent adaptation to emerging technologies, such as the 
internet of things and artificial intelligence. As progressively more devices are connected to the 
internet, collecting and processing data, the amount of data will vastly increase. Granting control 
to individuals over their personal data will become more infeasible. Similarly, as artificial 
intelligence is embedded in more places, the sophistication of data processing will increase. 
Requiring understandable information from an artificial intelligence before providing consent 
will become more infeasible as well. Assuming these trends will hold, mandating increasingly 
infeasible requirements may stymie the development of emerging technologies with potential to 
improve lives. Even with lax enforcement, the problems with owning personal data and 
consenting to uses of it will only compound, and the sweeping provisions about ownership and 
consent in the GDPR will be a detriment. Like GDPR replaced a 1995 data protection law, 
another law will likely have to replace GDPR itself.   
 Lastly, there are two omissions in the regulation. Member states can choose to apply 
GDPR to government departments overseeing public or national security, and there are no 
provisions prohibiting the manipulation of individuals (European Union, Article 23). Regarding 
the former, the choice is pragmatic. If there is a public or national security threat, governments 
would want to use any data they have to address the situation. Yet, the harms that government 
security agencies can create with personal data far exceed the harms that other data controllers 
can inflict. During World War II, it was not IBM that interned Japanese Americans and sent 
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millions to concentration camps; it was government. There should be strict guidelines on how 
governments can collect and use personal data even during public or national security crises. 
During turbulent times, such as in war, governments will seek to use personal data and will 
violate individuals’ freedoms. Regulations like GDPR should have provisions to limit how much 
harm governments can inflict by decreasing their access to personal data in the first place. 
Moreover, the lack of specific regulations to curb manipulation using personal data is 
concerning. The regulation relies on consent to address manipulation by data controllers, but the 
consent itself can be manipulated by clever user interface design that nudges users to grant 
permissions or by omitting crucial information about data use. 
 Overall, GDPR represents a first effort by the European Union to address the lack of trust 
and the violation of freedoms in personal data processing and use in the 21st century. The law 
penalizes freedom violations, from security to discrimination, and provides recourse for 
negatively affected individuals. As applying my framework demonstrates, however, the 
legislation is flawed. The GDPR does not consider issues imposed by data ownership, 
technological change, government abuse, and undue manipulation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Personal data collection and processing is changing faster than the legal mechanisms and the 
social norms that should govern it, leading to violations of freedom and a deterioration of trust. I 
have argued that the way data rights fit into existing institutions can preserve freedom and reap 
the benefits of information technologies.  
 The history of social control through information processing and collecting points to the 
need for legislation to protect freedom. Although technology companies in the market are 
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attempting to assuage fears about personal data misuse, their recommended practices will not 
sufficiently address data rights. The market’s emphasis on property rights does not address the 
challenges that data poses for ownership and consent. Additionally, the negative conception of 
privacy supported by technology companies is unfair, leading to suspicion of privacy conscious 
individuals and requiring them to bear the heavy burden of policing personal data abuses.  
 To counter the market trend, I have proposed a framework for data rights in which data 
should enable trust in computing and allow individuals to pursue their conception of the good 
life without fear of abuse. This view will (1) refocus discourse on how we can engender trust in 
data use so as to expand opportunity and (2) provide a mechanism for rights to contend with 
violations of freedom even as technology changes.  
Applying the framework, I have shown that the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation also insufficiently addresses personal data protection by not considering 
issues imposed by data ownership, technological change, government abuse, and undue 
manipulation. The law, however, remains a good initial step in creating substantial data rights 
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